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To Forsake, to Forswear
The Freedom of Abandoning the Oath
within King Richard II
Abby Thatcher

“The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Whither
is God?’ he cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are

his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who

gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we
unchained this earth from its sun?’”

—From Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 181

Readers familiar with The

Life and Death of

King Richard II will remember its deposition scene. King Richard has
arrived at Westminster Abbey, and Bolingbroke, Northumberland, and
other members of the court receive him. Officials bearing the symbols of
monarchical power—the crown and the scepter—accompany the King.
By Act 4, Scene 1, it is no longer a question of whether Richard will give
up “tired majesty” through “the resignation of [his] state and crown / To
Henry Bolingbroke” (4.1.170–81). Rather, critical waters continue to churn
with explanations as to how and when the resignation takes place within the
scene. How does Richard unking himself? Through and by self-reference. “I
will undo myself” (4.1.203, my emphasis). Self-referentiality, a feature of both
the Austinian performative and Schmittian model of absolute sovereignty,
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suspends. In the case of J. L. Austin’s performative, sense and meaning
are suspended; in the case of Carl Schmitt’s state of exception, emergency
and convention are suspended. Both put the speaker/sovereign forward as
the decisive fact. In this moment—a king undoing his kingness—Richard
suspends convention and meaning through the performative utterance.
Utterances and their power are central to King Richard II because it
is a play about the making and breaking of oaths. Richard’s feudal court
fails because of broken oaths and empty words. The tragic king mourns
the tragedy of failed oaths, misplaced trust, and loyalties unraveled upon
the Welsh beach as he says, “Of comfort no man speak” (3.2.144). Richard,
upon the news of deserted oaths and failed promises of military support,
recognizes that to place faith in words is misguided and to seek comfort from
promises is futile. The crown is rendered hollow in the scene and cast aside
as not merely a recognition that power has been stripped for him, but as an
awareness of uncovered realities—his monarchical might relies most heavily
upon sworn fealty and a bodified corporation bound by their word. Richard’s
crown is hollow because the words of those who have sworn loyalty are
hollow. With their failed oaths, his kingdom falls into the hands of another.
Richard’s loss of faith in the efficacy and surety of words—more properly,
the purposing of words alongside appropriate conventions as oaths—makes
the deposition scene all the more surprising, as Richard liberally bestows
words of his own upon his unfaithful court. Richard’s spoken listing of what
he gives up, and by what authority, reads at first speech-wact glance as
precisely that: a prolonged speech act that holds “I wash away . . . give away
. . . [and] deny” to be illocutionary utterances with deposing force—Richard
effectively speaking away his power. However, I argue that Richard is doing
more than the commonplace performative. He follows his stated intention to
undo himself with spoken surrender. When he says, “With mine own breath
release all duteous oaths. / All pomp and majesty I do forswear”1 (4.1.209–
10, my emphasis), Richard does not break oaths, and thus signifies a break
with the patterns established by others in his infelicitous court. Richard is
performing something far more radical: the forsaking of the oath, and, by so
doing, the transcending into a realm of total, agentic freedom.

1
To forswear is “to abandon or renounce an oath in a manner deemed irrevocable” (OED 1a); it is, quite literally, an anti-oath, as the prefix “for” means “away,
opposite, completely” and indicates loss or destruction.
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In my essay, I will argue that there is first, motivated breaking of
oaths performed throughout Richard II, revealing an awareness of their
sociopolitical affordances; that Richard, being burned by the oath’s false
sun, performs a radical forsaking of the system of the oath, effectively
“unchain[ing] his earth from its sun” (Nietzsche 181). Richard’s forsaking
enables a reading of Schmittian sovereignty as intensely performative and
predicated upon transcendence of ideological systems rather than God-man
theological authority. Further, I suggest that the heart of Richard’s tragedy
is comic, that forsaking triggers a comic release, and that the grandiose
campaign to achieve monarchical power is reduced, by Richard as prophetic
madman, to a game of bluffing only. Lastly, I argue that although Richard’s
ability to access total freedom may seem productively anti-Schmittian, the
unkinged king’s final act problematizes the felicity2 of unchaining oneself,
ultimately illustrating the deleterious effects of self-negation and hyperbolic
kenosis. Richard, in the end, succeeds fully in “undo[ing] [him]self” (4.1.203)
to his agency’s detriment.

I: Perceiving the False Sun,
or the Tragic Light

Christina Squitieri’s article concerning Aumerle’s treasonous plot seeks to
return gravitas to problematic readings of Act 5, Scenes 2 and 3 by recentering
the conversation upon feudal law and “the play’s anxiety [concerning] . . .
the connection between a man’s oath and his life” (32). She suggests that
these readings, which reduce the scenes to gendered squabbles and farced
comedy at the expense of the Duchess’s dignity and the Duke’s honor, are in
fact Shakespeare’s dismantling of perceived political stability and the false
steadfastness of oaths. While Squitieri finds political vulnerability—brought
about by the breaking of feudal promises—despite the best efforts of those
who seek to make felicitous bonds, I wish to work with those within the
play whose efforts are directly targeted at the breaking of oaths, the failure
of their word. Certainly, the enacting of felicitous performatives is a perilous
endeavor, especially when the murky waters of intentionality churn and
2
J. L. Austin labels a successful performative utterance as “felicitous” and an
unsuccessful performative utterance as “infelicitous.” I will use terms such as “felicity” to convey such performative success.
99
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when swearing fealty attempts to place mortals at the immortal place
where words and actions coincide.3 But looking toward the oath-breakers
within Richard II as self-aware agents reveals two new phenomena. One,
the motivated breaking of oaths is performed through the best efforts of the
oath-makers and shows the sociopolitical affordances of manipulating oath’s
binding form. Two, Richard does not break, but rather forsakes, the entire
oath-making system, as he is self-aware prey to the oath’s tragic, inherent
infirmity.4
Certainly the “tragedy” of the king’s two bodies, as said by Ernst
Kantorowicz and carried forward by critics of his work, is well-documented.
Richard’s kingly tragedy illuminates the failure of Kantorowicz’s corpus
reipublicae mysticum and polity-centered kingship as, no longer an
incorporated God-man by the “plurality of persons collected in one body”
(310), his mythic “bodified” body becomes as hollow as his crown. Further, the
role of the genre tragedy as disillusioning tool and transhistorical form with
sociopolitical affordances has been argued by Franco Moretti and Caroline
Levine, respectively. Moretti claims “English tragedy [to be] nothing less than
the negation and dismantling of the Elizabethan World Picture” (12), and that
tragedy deprives the monarch of its central mythological bastion: “power . . .
founded in a transcendent design, in an intentional and significant order”
(9). Levine posits the tragic form to be transhistorical, capable of “ordering,
patterning, or shaping . . . sociopolitical realities” (3), revealing upon closer
3
The Anselmically conceived God, or God as the place at which words and
actions perfectly coincide. From Anselm: “There is, then, so truly a being than which
nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist;
and this being thou art, O Lord, our God” (54–5).
4
In the early modern sense, I work from tragedy or tragic as written in an
elevated style and dealing with sorrowful or disastrous events, typically the downfall or death of a powerful or important person and opposed to comedy (OED 1a).
I note comedy’s definition here as a point of comparison and a further qualifier of
“happy” or, more pointedly, felicitous: “comedy, n., in the Middle Ages: a narrative
poem intended to entertain the hearer or reader and having a happy ending” (OED
1a). To return to tragedy, I also make mention of the modern, or more general sense,
of tragedy being simply “any literary or dramatic work dealing with serious themes
and having an unhappy ending” (OED 1b). In either case, in light of the speech act,
I take “unhappy” or tragic as synonymic with infelicitous, or the unsuccessful performative. To uphold conventions and to enact the performative utterance with the
intention to keep it (Austin’s messy gamma conditions) is to bring about a felicitous
ending; to fail to do so is to bring about an infelicitous, tragic ending.
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inspection the values of a given performing society. Moretti’s deconstructive
use of the tragic form—toward “dissolution” and the “overthrowing of old
ideas” (7)—describes the precise movement of tragedy through historical
moments and cultural imaginaries.
I find that the oath once more is overlooked in arguments regarding the
tragedy of the king’s two bodies, the form of tragedy as somehow separate
from the failure of conventions and infelicitous endings, or, as in Moretti’s
case, tragedy’s “degradation of the cultural image of the sovereign” (9). In
watching his kingdom fall around him, Richard sees that it is man’s word
and perceived bonds of fidelity that hold the pieces together in its own
“intentional and significant order” and that upon their failure to keep oaths,
his world shatters. The tragedy recenters itself in Richard’s mind upon
the word, as in the close of the Welsh beach sequence, as he says, “Let no
man speak again to alter this, for counsel is but vain . . . He does me double
wrong / That wounds me with the flatteries of his tongue” (3.2.213, 215–6).
I suggest that Moretti’s reading of the tragedy as breaking apart myths of
divine investiture, leaving a nude emperor in its cutting wake a la David
Norbrook’s article, holds the most critical traction if it is the breaking of
oaths—”unhappy” or infelicitous, tragic breaking with convention—that is
the underpinning performative to such radical upheaval of the conventional
world order, rather than tragedy more generally. Further, while the play
does perform the degradation of Richard’s court and world for audiences
willing to see it, or, as in Lorna Hutson’s “Imagining Justice: Kantorowicz
and Shakespeare,” willing to democratically perform it, I find that Richard
also experiences the disillusionment Moretti credits singularly to the “entire
political body” (10). Richard’s tragedy is nothing less than the negation and
dismantling of the Oath as Bond World Picture, but counter to Moretti’s
theorization of tragedy, the dismantling happens only in the eyes of the failed
king. Richard unchains the earth of his kingdom from the old, false sun by
the light of tragedy’s form. Henry, the Duke of York, and Northumberland
continue to live within the Elizabethan World Picture, unable—perhaps
unwilling, as I shall soon discuss—to let go of the oath as Ptolemaic center in
a heliocentric reality.
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II: Circling the False Sun
Still, or Richard Unchains
Himself

There is a surprisingly swift reassembly of formal feudal oaths and a sworn
court for the newly kinged Henry IV. Although Henry has witnessed the
dissolution of oaths surrounding Richard, he is the beneficiary of the same
broken-oath-makers then making oaths of loyalty to him. Rather than
acknowledging reality—the inherent indefensibility and utter instability of
feudal oaths, or of oaths generally (he himself an oft-time breaker of oaths
made to God, king, and country)—by breaking faith with the oath system,
Henry reestablishes the oath as ideological binding agent in his kingdom.
Henry’s awareness of the sociopolitical affordances of the oath, despite its
tragic shortcomings and dynamic vulnerabilities; his willingness to continue
to be hailed and answer, time and again, the oath as God’s interpellating call;
and his own breaking of faith to oaths betokens a fidelity to the form of the
oath. To break an oath is still to acknowledge the oath’s binding power—
that it can be broken at all tells us that it existed in the first place—and to
recognize a construct that can demand guilt, shame, and recompense from,
and punishment unto, the person who swore falsely. Pseudo-sacralizing
the word for sociopolitical ends, the oath can be broken only when, and as,
subjects continually answer its interpellating call.
How, then, is Richard’s forswearing any different? For at first glance, it
appears to be a breaking of oath, as he effectively promised upon coronation
to be king until death, but now he willingly deposes himself. I suggest that
Richard abandons the system entirely. To be Althusserian, Richard does
not respond to its hailing call. He performs a Lucretian swerve when he
forsakes, rather than breaks, the oath. When he releases himself from the
so-called binding power of words, he signifies a break with the patterns that
hold together his world order. Richard is thus provided with the “free will
which living things throughout the world have . . . whereby we step right
forward where desire / Leads each man on” (Lucretius 251, 253–4). Richard
transcends—what I suggest as being the true center of Schmitt’s model of
sovereignty—into a sphere of total, agentic power. I say agentic to indicate
a person not only self-organizing and proactive, but also self-reflecting and
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self-referential, suspending the conventional order of things and putting
themselves forward as the final reality.5 It is to reify the state of exception in
oneself, and to declare that no authority exists outside of the self.
Here, I turn to Schmitt’s words on the sovereign of state being modelled
after the “value of the church.” “The value of the state is that it makes a
decision, the value of the church is that it is the last unappealable decision”
(42). The church as a structure has no higher authority than God, or no higher
mortal authority, and therefore stands sovereign in matters of theocratic
power. Schmitt theorizes the sovereign’s appeal to a higher power in terms
of transcendence: no one is a higher power, for the “essential thing is that no
higher authority [in the state] reviews the decision” (43). Instead of wordbound, law-made oversight, Schmitt’s political theology centers around a
sovereign with the power to determine the exception by virtue of his not
needing approval from any but a God. Even then, if God is believed to be
one and the same—in effect, the self-referencing fact—as the King, the King
becomes God as far as lacking anyone higher than him in the epistemological
and ontological hierarchies of the here and the beyond. Assuming such a
perfect identity—again, King as self-referencing sovereign God—enables
a passing “through the metaphysical, political and sociological ideas and
[a postulating of] the sovereign as a personal unit and final creator” (35).
Schmitt’s historical context—writing in the death throes of the Weimar
Republic toward a nascent dictatorial end—illustrates well the devastating
power of the transcendent sovereign ideological paradigm. Like any ideology,
it does not acknowledge its constructed, motivated nature; it is a means to
an end, namely, the retaining of power and the maintenance of a hierarchical
structure that enables unilateral decision making under the auspices of
transcendent, unchecked by all but self, authority.
Subjects within the ideology, including the king himself, are subject to
a colonization of consciousness informed by ideological state apparatus of
religion and sacral language. Richard’s forsaking swerve is a reclaiming and
reshaping of Schmittian sovereignty, as he acknowledges sacral word as
only word, declares the crown and its undergirding support of the oath to be
hollow—only an ideology, nothing more—and transcends the “political and
5
Giorgio Agamben speaks of the same in his Sacrament of Language: “That
is to say, the performative substitutes for the denotative relationship between speech
and fact a self-referential relation that, putting the former out of play, puts itself forward as the decisive fact” (Agamben 55).
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sociological ideas” of his time to become most fully “sovereign as a personal
unit and final creator” (35). Continuing his seeming tragedy’s disillusioning
arc, which reaches an apex of poetic mourning in Act 3 (Act 4 being but an
acting upon his new, negative paradigm), at the point of deposition Richard
has abandoned any stock or faith in the oath’s power to bind, and further,
has recognized the oath as only language. Ideological power stems from
answering interpellation. Richard, in a proto-Bartleby stance, prefers not to
be hailed, abandons the hollow word with his hollow crown—the hollowness
of the words the cause for the crown’s void—and, at the culmination of his
deposition, stands free of all “care,” including responsibility that only he can
give to a system of language he no longer believes in.

III: “The Sun Did Make
Beholders Wink,” or the
Comic Release

In effect, Richard shockingly mimes atheism in a system placing the sworn
word as the highest, transcendent power, an atheism such as Stathis
Gourgouris wishes there to be, an “atheism that will have emancipated itself
from” the belief system in power, thus rendering “the matter of belief or
nonbelief in [its power] irrelevant, or, more significantly, would recognize
it as a matter of performance“ (44). In short, Richard sees oath-making as
a matter of performance only, laughably enacted with great “pomp and
majesty.” The oath is stripped of its sacris verbi regalia. The emperor’s new
clothes are seen to be but fiction. In truth, the desacralization of the oath is
a comic release, with Richard the only one aware that all great figures of
sovereignty—”Glory,” “Sovereignty” itself, “Majesty,” and “State”—have
been redressed as comedic peasant tropes: “For I have given here my soul’s
consent / T’undeck the pompous body of a king, / Made Glory base and
Sovereignty a slave, / Proud Majesty a subject, / State a peasant” (4.1.248–
52). Though Henry and his court would deny it, and are unwilling to see it,
they have killed the god of the oath and unchained the sun around which
their medieval world order turned. With every breaking of an oath that, in
its breakage, shows its frailty and utter impotency to bind men effectively,
the play moves toward a comedy that only Richard can appreciate, as he
104
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stands alone as madman in the town square to announce that they have
all “crack[ed] the strong warrant of an oath” (4.1.235). In the tragedy of the
unkinged king, only Richard has nothing “grieved” (4.1.216).
To make his forswearing complete, Richard calls for a mirror:
Give me that glass, and therein will I read.
[Takes looking-glass.] . . .
O, flatt’ring glass,
Like to my followers in prosperity,
Thou dost beguile me. Was this face the face
That like the sun did make beholders wink?
Is this the face which faced so many follies,
That was at last outfaced by Bolingbroke?
A brittle glory shineth in this face—
As brittle as the glory is the face! [Shatters glass.]
For there it is, cracked in an hundred shivers. (4.1.276, 279–89)

I emphasize a few words to reckon with the power of Richard’s swerving
forsaking. First, while Richard asks for a mirror, Bolingbroke summons a
“looking-glass”; the stage direction also uses “looking-glass” over “mirror.”
While the same in connotation and established meaning—a looking-glass is
never defined as something other than a reflective surface in which to see
the self—I suggest that “looking” glass speaks also to a matter of perspective,
a mode of looking at the world, a lens through which to perceive reality: in
short, an ideology.
Further, Richard declares this ideology beguiling, or deceptive, to himself
and those who will follow. Second, he reflects at length upon “face.” Face is
used as both noun and verb: “was this face the face / That like the sun did
make beholders wink” (4.1.281–2) and “is this the face which faced so many
follies” (4.1.283). Face as transitive verb is to confront, thus “which faced so
many follies” is most readily understood as confronting mistakes or dangers.
But “face” as intransitive verb can mean “to bluff” or “to show a false face,
maintain a false appearance,” as in 1 Henry IV (1616), “Suffolke doth not
flatter, face, or faine” (5.5.98), or in earlier Roger Ascham’s The Scholemaster
(1570), “To laughe, to lie, to flatter, to face: Foure waies in Court to win men
grace” (I.f.15). If read with this sense, “was this face the face / That like the
sun did make beholders wink” and “is this the face which faced so many
follies” are Richard’s acknowledgements of the trick of royalty held up by
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words, in short, the false appearance of the unassailable king, a monarchical
bluff on a kingly scale.
My close reading of “face” may seem a bluff itself, if not for the second
witness: “outfaced,” in line 286 as transitive verb is to disconcert, silence, or
defeat by a display of confidence or arrogance; its earliest use was to boast in
a game, as in John Skelton’s Bowge of Courte (1499), “Fyrste pycke a quarrel
and fall oute with hym then, / And soo outface hym with a carde of ten.”6
The mirror scene thus is Richard’s Nietzschean madman soliloquy as he
reflects on the face, or bluff, that has been defeated by Bolingbroke’s outface,
or better, gambit—but both are only bluffs, or empty, dead words. When
Richard says, “A brittle glory shineth in this face [read: bluff] — / As brittle
as the glory is the face [bluff]” (4.1.287–8), he makes clear that the glory is
as brittle as the bluff of language, the bluff of the oath. The monarchical
bluff—that glorious monarchy is strong, invulnerable, founded upon lasting
loyalties held in inviolable place by iuramenti—is called. Richard shatters
the illusion, the deceptive ideology. The world view as seen through this
ideological looking-glass is splintered into unrecognizable and alienated
pieces, “cracked in[to] an hundred shivers” (4.1.289). Just as he calls out the
comic nature of the feudal oath, Richard here speaks to language’s gameplaying, acknowledging that, when the cards are down, to win the king’s
hand is only a matter of “outfacing”—outbluffing—all others at the table,
and nothing more.

IV: Without a Sun, or
Richard Indefinitely
Unchained

I have referenced Nietzsche’s Parable of the Madman while dressing
Richard, the traditionally Christological figure, in the sartorial trappings of
a sacralized language atheist; an easy parallel is found between Richard’s
shivering of the mirror and the madman’s reaction to his listeners’ silent
6
See also Portia’s aside to Nerissa in The Merchant of Venice (1600): “Thou
mayst; I warrant we shall have old swearing / That they did give the rings away to
men. / But we’ll outface them, and outswear them too” (4.2.15–7); and Iden to Cade
in Henry VI, Pt. 2 (1616): “See if thou canst outface me with thy looks” (4.9.45).
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astonishment and defiant incomprehension: “at last he threw his lantern
on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out” (182). Certainly, the
philosophical implications of the parable hold merit in a discussion of such
radical awareness—on Richard’s part—that the Lancastrian world spins
around an empty void. Akin to the Copernican Revolution, begun in 1542
with Nicolaus Copernicus’s On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres
and offering an alternative model of the universe to Ptolemy’s geocentric
system (serving here as a contemporaneous text to Richard II’s period of
publication rather than its historical context), Richard unchains monarchy’s
earth from its previous “sun”7 or center around which perceived reality
revolves. There will never again be a monarchy bounded by an unaware,
language-determined, and fixed ideological horizon.
This sounds remarkably and, if I may be bold, productively antiSchmittian: sovereignty to be held by those willing to entirely forsake,
and thus transcend, the current systems of power, opening up a Butlerian
lacuna within which resignifying acts may occur, destabilizing false-sunned
models of oppression—such as Schmittian dictatorship—with the power of
forswearing. Indeed, Richard may seem in Act 5 to be a fully tragic hero, if
indeed “tragedy is that which ‘eternally negates’” (Moretti 10); he is fully
emptied, hyperbolically and almost painfully kenotic. Certainly, there
are grounds to read Richard’s negation as constructive, even within the
Middle Ages’ practice of negative thinking. Richard Helgerson writes of
“the negative other, the not x” as “an unworldly and nonhuman divinity—
an other that served to define by opposition the general human condition
rather than the condition of some particular social order” (102). By the time
of Shakespeare and the Jacobean dawn, “the axis of negative thought rotated
from the vertical to the horizontal, from theology to social criticism” (102).
Negative thinking had become “a game, but a game that erupts from the
confines of its own playfulness to become a powerful force in another, larger
game, coextensive with culture itself. You cannot play one without playing
the other” (118). In Act 5, Scene 5, Richard engages in playful language, puns
unlocked, poetics unfettered by earlier kingly cares. He lives in the comic
space he discovered in Act 4, Scene 1, but he plays a different game. Whereas
before Richard faced and was outfaced at the game of bluffing king, he
now plays at being nothing: he is “eased / With being nothing” (5.5.40–1).
7
Like unto Nietzsche’s parable: “we have unchained this earth from its sun”
(Nietzsche 181).
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His negative thought creates a true—and destructively total—suspension
between sense and meaning, as, unwilling to enter any system that would
bind, he spins out alone, fully “undo[ing] [him]self” (4.1.203). To paraphrase
and extend Helgerson’s line of thought, “by putting the sign of negation on
the world [he knows], [Richard] open[s] the way to another world” (102) but
fails to join it.
Instead, Richard vacillates8 in inaction: “Thoughts tending to ambition,
they do plot / Unlikely wonders” (5.5.18–9) that Richard never acts upon:
“Thus play I in one person many people / And none contented” (5.5.31–2).
Richard is bound only by Time, which has “made [him] his numb’ring clock”
(5.5.50), and with death, is unbound by even Time’s “outward watch” (5.5.52).
He practices negation and kenosis to a paralyzing degree, continually calling
all into question and reckoning with being utterly alone.9 Richard’s problem
is not that he isn’t free, but that he is too free. He has divorced himself from
every commitment which would ground him, even those that he, in full
agency now, could select with open eyes, and thus, finds his agency limited
again: this time because he has removed himself from every system within
which he could choose to act. The realm of human affairs, writes Hannah
Arendt, “consists of the web of human relationships which exist wherever
men live together” (1173). Richard has transcended the realm of human
affairs, even before death, by forsaking every binding form. In so doing, he
loses the ability to bind together his self-identity, to have a name to act—for
how to have a name in the gap between systems if one never answers to an
interpellating call?

8
From Nietzsche: “Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving?
Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward,
in all directions? Is there still any way up or down? Are we not straying as though
through an infinite nothing” (181)?
9
When no one follows Richard into the forsaking void to spin freely
away from the bluffed center of the oath, Richard appears to do as the madman in
Nietzsche’s parable does: he goes to inhabit the tomb of his dead gods. Richard begs
the Queen to “think I am dead, and that even here thou tak’st, / As from my deathbed, thy last living leave” (5.1.38–9), thus transforming his once dualled God-man self
into a tomb, a husk of its former self. In essence, Richard asks what an unkinged king
is if not the tomb and sepulcher of its power. Nietzsche’s madman replies nothing
after being dragged from empty churches but, “What after all are these churches now
if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God” (Nietzsche 182)?
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Thus, while there is freedom in the forsaking of the oath, it is only
freedom insofar as it enables an agent to access a place of greater freedom; it
is only freeing if it frees the sight—by shattering the “looking-glass” so that
one becomes aware it was a glass, not the real, all along—such that one can
knowingly engage in the world around with greater meaning and more total
ontological commitment. Richard is shivered into a hundred pieces when he
abandons his old-world order; he does not “redo” himself post-shattering,
and instead dies fractured. In the end, Richard finds that his indefinite state
of exception is paralyzing. Unable to move forward onto new ideological
ground and unwilling to go back to the worlds he once knew, Richard finds
absolute, transcendent sovereignty to be paradoxically and deathly limiting.
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